"This Contradictory but Fantastic Thing": *Student Networks and Political Activism in Cold War Taiwanese/America*

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Student Networks and Political Activism in Cold War Taiwanese/America

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ABSTRACT. In the 1960s and 1970s, tens of thousands of Taiwanese migrants came to the United States as graduate students during Taiwan's long period of martial law; many became politically active against the Kuomintang regime, and were subsequently blacklisted. This article examines these student migrants' processes of political formation and the vital networks through which their political consciousness took shape—in particular, Taiwanese student and community associations. These conditions of being are considered in the ideological and geopolitical context of the Cold War era, raising issues of legibility and visibility for geographies and histories occluded by U.S. militarism.

In August 1972, Edward Cheng (鄭德昌)[1] left Taiwan to attend the University of Wisconsin, Madison, as a graduate student in nuclear engineering. The campus was awash with student protests against the war in Vietnam. Not long after his arrival, Cheng recalled attending a campus event at which a young Vietnamese man spoke, criticizing the U.S. government's actions in Vietnam. According to Cheng,

> I just wonder how is it possible, because there was a war going on, and these people are supposed to be the enemies of the US, and how could they come to the US and then talk about how US invaded them? . . . This is unthinkable if you were in Taiwan. So I think this is probably how democracy and freedom thinking works, to allow this kind of . . . contradictory, but fantastic thing.[2]

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Cheng was one of more than a hundred thousand student migrants who arrived in the United States from Taiwan from the 1960s to the 1980s.[3] Although coming from a deeply repressive society that had been under martial law since 1949, many Taiwanese students quickly gained the courage to participate in this "contradictory, but fantastic thing." They started—or soon joined—student associations, and created diasporic networks across the United States and reaching Canada, Japan, Europe, and South America. They created and circulated their own political publications within Taiwanese communities, but also boldly entered into mainstream spaces of dialogue. They organized mass protests and actions; some plotted revolution through both peaceful and violent means.

The moment Cheng remembers is also significant because the young Vietnamese man who spoke at the University of Wisconsin was likely a member of the Union of Vietnamese.[4] The Union of Vietnamese was a U.S.-based, grassroots organization of Vietnamese opposed to the war, founded by students who had come to the United States on U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) scholarships; the students' pro-U.S. stance was assumed, and they had not been expected or intended to develop such a critique.[5] As May Fu puts it, however, "Their enrollment in US universities . . . initiated the beginning of an unexpected political education."[6] This sharing of space on a U.S. campus between two Asian student migrants, each expressing or developing his political views in a circumstance created simultaneously by U.S. militarism and apparent U.S. benevolence, is an important window into Asian/American political histories that are still relatively unknown. While the importance of students educated in the United States has been acknowledged in various national (non-U.S.) histories, argues Chih-ming Wang, "The foreign student lurks at the edges of Asian American history and representation, sometimes acknowledged but oftentimes unrecognized."[7]

With regard to Taiwanese student migrants in particular, this lacuna, I suggest, is due to lingering Cold War epistemologies and structures of power,[8] as well as the tendency within Asian American studies to treat Taiwanese as either unequivocally Chinese or class-privileged migrants without any politics to speak of.[9] While many student migrants from Taiwan self-identified as Chinese (largely those who came from families who had fled China with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang [KMT] regime), a significant portion came from families who had lived in Taiwan for generations, and identified, or would soon come to identify, as Taiwanese.[10] During the 1960s, political scientist Douglas Mendel estimated that up to 20 percent of Taiwanese-identified migrants were politically active, and an overwhelming majority of those involved in Taiwanese social organiza-

tions were "sympathetic" to Taiwan independence.[11] Similarly, in a survey of Taiwanese students and professionals in 1970, Shu Yuang Chang found that "anti-Chiang, pro-democracy sentiment" was widespread, and almost one-fifth "listed 'escape' as [a] reason for leaving Taiwan."[12]

This article examines the historical forces, social and institutional networks, and structures of feeling through which Taiwanese-identified student migrants became politicized on U.S. university campuses in the 1960s and 1970s. In particular, I examine how Taiwanese student associations (TSAs or *tongxuehui*) and Taiwanese associations (*tongxianghui*) served as a vital infrastructure for the patchwork process of political formation in which diasporic Taiwanese in the United States engaged. The TSAs built networks of friendship and trust, often as an explicit alternative to the "Chinese" student associations frequented by Chinese-identified students from Taiwan; many of the latter had direct ties to government agencies, served as venues for monitoring Taiwanese students, and espoused pro-KMT sentiments. Ultimately, some high-profile events carried out by Taiwanese-identified students confirmed the authoritarian government's fears, including the attempted assassination of Chiang Ching-kuo in New York City in 1970 by Peter Huang (黃文雄), a lapsed graduate student at Cornell University; and a series of shootings and bombings at several KMT offices and officials across the United States in 1979 and 1980, which resulted in the temporary placement of Taiwanese on the FBI's terrorist watch list.[13] More commonly, Taiwanese used their educational and personal networks to find one another and transmit information on political developments in Taiwan. They wrote and disseminated tracts advocating self-determination for Taiwan; some connected Taiwan's situation to the Third World Left and debated the finer points of Marxist theory. Personal visits back to Taiwan could serve as opportunities to smuggle information and even material objects such as radio broadcasting equipment.[14]

Taiwanese student politicization in the United States, then, took shape through three important, interrelated conditions: (1) a latent subaltern mentality stemming from multiple histories of colonization in Taiwan; (2) tightly connected institutional networks of sociality—including lasting Taiwanese school ties and U.S. university-based contexts that facilitated the formation of the associations; and (3) greater access to written materials and other media and freedom of expression. By looking at how these conditions worked together to foster political activism through the firsthand experiences and perspectives of former student activists, I position Taiwanese migrants in Asian/American history as political actors with complex subjectivities, and illuminate how they used institutionally based social networks in creative and politically strategic ways. In that sense, this

is also a study of how broader social relationships and structures nurture and sustain activism, particularly diasporic political activism. Accordingly, it is not meant to be a comprehensive history of Taiwanese independence activism in the United States; while I will refer to some Taiwanese activist groups that were prominent during this time period, the primary focus is on student associations and campus-based networks.

I conducted in-depth interviews with twenty-five Taiwanese-identified student migrants who came to the United States in the 1960s and 1970s and became politically active to various degrees from 2011 to 2015 in various locations in the United States and Taiwan. My parents were politically active, Taiwanese student migrants with extensive community ties, and so selection and recruitment of participants began with family members and longtime acquaintances. Additional participants were then contacted and recruited using the snowball method, combined with direct outreach to known political activists. Participants included seventeen men and eight women, whose years of birth range from 1932 to 1952. The gender skew reflects the disproportionate number of men who migrated as students during this time period, as well as traditional gender roles in Japanese-influenced, Taiwanese culture; however, I have tried to redress this skew by purposefully seeking out women interviewees. Firsthand accounts of student migrants' experiences and perspectives offer a view into the "complex personhood"[15] of Taiwanese migrants—as simultaneously benefiting from and resistant to oppressive regimes of power. These experiences and perspectives open up a broad space of analysis to understand diverse forms of political activism across a spectrum of social groups and class positions.

Cold War Taiwanese/America and Asian American Studies

While diasporic Taiwanese in the United States were not exceptional among Asian Americans in their transpacific political orientations and engagement,[16] as a political collectivity and as a people shaped by Cold War geopolitics and legacies of imperialism and colonialism, they have been generally overlooked in Asian American studies.[17] The majority of migrants from Taiwan came as part of what Madeline Hsu describes as the shift in immigration laws "from restriction to selection" of "immigrants seen as enhancing the national economy."[18] The routes that permitted them to make lives in the United States have made Taiwanese/Americans serviceable for model minority discourses and relatively class privileged, while their occupational paths often fostered complicity with the Cold War military-industrial complex. Antipathy toward China—inculcated in both Taiwan and the United States—bred virulent anticommunism, while

Taiwan's long reliance on U.S. political protection and economic assistance nurtured belief in Western liberal ideologies and tendencies toward political conservatism. After coming to the United States, these beliefs tended to be reinforced by model minority and American exceptionalist discourses. Within Asian American studies, a scholarly field borne of leftist social movements that has tended to privilege narratives of resistance, these characteristics might render diasporic Taiwanese communities difficult or unappealing as objects of inquiry.

Nonetheless, it is important to understand how U.S. power and interests shaped the basic conditions of Taiwanese migration. Previous to KMT rule, Taiwan had been a colony of Japan for fifty years, until Japan lost World War II and Taiwan's fate, along with that of Japan's other colonies, was ceded to the U.S.-led Allies. After losing the Chinese Civil War to the communists, the KMT took control of the island with U.S. backing, and were subsequently supported financially and militarily by the United States for decades. Finally, against the backdrop of the Cold War, the approved categories for immigration and concomitant specialties of Taiwanese student migrants served U.S. diplomatic goals as well as labor needs of the U.S. military-industrial complex.[19] Taiwanese/Americans, then, like so many other Asians and Pacific Islanders, should be considered as political and historical beings shaped by specific global histories of migration and militarism. As Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho have asserted, the contemporary history of Asia and the Pacific cannot be understood without attention to how both Japanese and U.S. imperialism and militarism have warped the fates of people and places.[20] More specifically, as Jodi Kim writes, the Cold War was triangulated in Asia, and decidedly not "cold" there, but hot and bloody.[21] In Kim's analysis, Cold War logics—as epistemologies and worldviews—continue to frame politics and everyday lives in ways that have yet to be fully reckoned with. Similarly, Taiwanese cultural studies scholar Kuan-Hsing Chen argues that inter-Asian comparative analysis and horizontal dialogue are necessary in order to put into practice not only decolonization, but also "deimperialization" and "de–cold war."[22] For Chen, deimperialization refers to the need for participation in critical reflection and action from the location and standpoint of the former (or continuing) imperialists, while de–cold war refers to developing a critical awareness and reckoning with how cold war geopolitics shaped and continue to influence contemporary Asian history.

To date, English-language materials on the transnational political and social history of Taiwan remain limited. Shu-mei Shih has argued that the relative absence of Taiwanese immigrants and Taiwanese Americans from scholarly inquiry has to do with Taiwan's lack of legibility in existing

intellectual paradigms.[23] The obscuring of its heterogeneous ethnic identities by Chinese Nationalist rule, U.S. support of the Nationalist regime, and inter-Asian twentieth-century colonization has rendered it marginal or effectively illegible to Asian American studies, Asian studies, sinology/Chinese studies, and postcolonial studies.[24] Scholarly literature in English focusing centrally on Taiwanese Americans includes only about a dozen published monographs, of which only a handful are known or legible within Asian American studies.[25] For the most part, within this scholarship, the continuous outmigration of students from the 1960s to the 1990s has been characterized primarily as part of the pursuit of individual and family betterment and as a desire to participate in the "American Dream."[26] When political factors are mentioned, they have most often been presented as ancillary rather than central. The focus of broader literature inclusive of Taiwanese immigrants has been on enclave formation, transpacific economic and social processes, and professional networks.[27] Most of this literature also focuses primarily if not exclusively on the period from the late 1980s forward, coincident with the lifting of martial law and the democratization of Taiwan. As a result, the best-known work on Taiwanese immigrants highlights their transpacific "astronaut" lifestyles, their "parachute kids," and their "flexible citizenship," as they move strategically between nations and situate family members in elite houses, schools, and workplaces across the Pacific Rim.[28]

Only a few address in any detail the motivations, experiences, and consciousness formation of the generation of Taiwanese-identified immigrants who came to the United States during a thirty-eight-year period of martial law (one of the longest in modern history).[29] However, as Abdelmalek Sayad has pointed out, one cannot speak of immigration without also speaking of emigration.[30] This was a period of tremendous state repression and violence during which tens of thousands of people in Taiwan—largely (though not all) "native" Taiwanese—were imprisoned, executed, or went missing. In 1947's February 28 Incident, which sparked the mass uprisings that led to the imposition of martial law, an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 Taiwanese were summarily executed.[31] By 1960, one internal government report estimated 126,000 Taiwanese missing (in an era when travel abroad was heavily restricted). Over the next several decades, a period known in Taiwan as the White Terror, more than 90,000 were arrested under charges of sedition, and thousands were executed or imprisoned. The population as a whole was subjected to high levels of social control, surveillance, censorship, and intimidation.[32] In contrast to later periods of Taiwanese immigrant experience, many who emigrated during this time period were effectively forbidden from returning to Taiwan via the KMT's blacklist. Those

who did return risked arrest and even, in a few cases, murder at the hands of government operatives. Possible consequences for those who stayed in the United States included harassment of relatives remaining in Taiwan, emotional trauma, indefinite separation from loved ones, and, for some, a prolonged period of statelessness.

Under Nationalist rule, increasing desires for Taiwanese independence were "foreclosed" by Cold War bipolarity that favored KMT anticommunism on the right and communist China on the left.[33] The United States supported the development of Taiwan's postwar, export-oriented economy; provided weapons and the promise of military protection against China; and, until 1979, recognized Taiwan (as the Republic of China) over China. At the same time, the U.S.-dominated global regime looked on impassively as KMT operatives murdered, jailed, and psychologically terrorized the majority of Taiwan's population over four decades. Within the United States, the FBI cooperated with and allowed the KMT to spy on and intimidate Taiwanese students and migrants. These conditions bonded Taiwanese-identified student migrants to the United States and created specific routes for migration, but also rendered them invisible as a people and made their drives for political independence effectively illegible to the larger world. How could independence-minded Taiwanese convince the world that Taiwan had a right to determine the terms of its own existence if, under the distorting shadows of Cold War geopolitics, much of the world could not even comprehend the conditions of that existence—and if the largest shadow over that comprehension was Taiwan's supposed benefactor and protector, the United States?

"Read the Newspaper Upside Down": The Anticolonial Roots of Taiwanese Political Consciousness

The motivations of these diasporic activists would not have taken shape in the way that they did if they did not tap into an existing anticolonial or subaltern mentality. A political consciousness with regard to Taiwan (台灣意識; Taiwan yìshí) emerged from a long history of antiauthoritarianism in Taiwan. In *Taiwan's 400 Year History*, a book well-known in Taiwan, Su Bing, a longtime leftist and Taiwanese independence activist, characterized this mentality as "the tradition of resisting foreign invasion."[34] According to Su, this began with indigenous resistance to the Dutch in the 1600s and continued through the Qing dynasty, and then into the subsequent periods of Japanese and KMT rule. Similarly, in *Formosa Betrayed,* George Kerr described Taiwan under Qing dynasty rule:

> Two centuries of ineffective and abusive rule . . . generated a local Formosan tradition of resentment and underlying hostility toward representatives of mainland authority. Riots and abortive independence movements took place so often that it became common in China to say of Formosa, "Every three years an uprising; every five years a rebellion." There were more than thirty violent outbursts in the 19th century.[35]

Su contends that these struggles and sentiments have created a distinct people and culture over time: "The 400 year history of Taiwan is not only a history of continuous domination. . . . It is also the history of a people willing to take risks for freedom, and above all, to fight back against exploitative oppressors."[36]

One of my interviewees, Chiu-shan Chen (陳秋山), who came to the United States as a graduate student in physics in 1962 and became a member of the radical World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) in the late 1970s, described the Taiwanese consciousness that emerged out of the island's historical circumstances in similar terms:

> It's an island always influence[d] by so many different outsider[s]. So gradually form its own identity. And I think . . . the poor fate of Taiwan make Taiwanese even have to think more about help[ing] Taiwan. Because [Taiwan is] always under somebody's mercy, right? Japanese, Chinese. . . . They rule us, they don't treat us equally. They give you a small benefit, then we are so grateful. Actually that should be ours to start. Right?[37]

In recent years, Kuan-Hsing Chen has critiqued this line of thinking for privileging the experience of Han Chinese settlers to the exclusion of indigenous peoples and ethnic Chinese minorities who also live in Taiwan, and dismisses it as narrow ethnic nationalism.[38] While I generally agree with the former critique, the latter must be clarified. It is true that this way of thinking could be (and has been) expressed in ethnically exclusive or divisive ways;[39] however, this was not necessarily the case in the 1960s and 1970s. Even in Su Bing's *400 Year History*, a central object of Chen's critique, Su is not ethnically deterministic. He includes indigenous resistance in his history of the formation of Taiwanese consciousness and employs a leftist class and colonial analysis throughout the book that does not preclude "Mainlander" Chinese in Taiwan from identifying as Taiwanese. In fact, Su states clearly at the outset, "Through time, Taiwan has integrated *all of its inhabitants* into 'the Taiwanese nation.'"[40] According to Su, the defining characteristic of what makes someone Taiwanese is not ethnicity or race,

but the shared experience of "domination by foreign colonialists."[41] While ethnic Chinese in Taiwan have yet to deal substantively with settler colonialism and the question of whether various groups in Taiwan would want to be "integrated . . . into 'the Taiwanese nation'" remains open,[42] my point here is simply that ethnic nationalism was not a given in earlier periods of activism for Taiwanese independence.

During the 1960s and 1970s, anti-KMT and pro-Taiwanese independence sentiments were not expressed primarily as ethnic animus, but rather, class and anticolonial resentment, and a principled desire for self-determination. As another interviewee, Lee Yuan-tse (李遠哲),[43] characterized the climate during his high school years in Taiwan in the 1950s, "This [is] the friction between the ruler and the oppressed, rather than Taiwanese and Mainland Chinese. But Mainland Chinese came as the ruler and dominator."[44] Indeed, in contrast to the anti-Chinese sentiment expressed by Taiwanese/American communities in more recent decades, until the 1970s, a subset of Taiwanese activists were interested in communist China as a potential ally against the KMT.[45] In short, the established population in Taiwan experienced the KMT as yet another colonizing entity. And in effect, it was: along with imposing state violence outright, the KMT elite inherited and profited from the hierarchical colonial structure already established by the Japanese, which subordinated the Taiwanese majority politically and economically. As Robert Edmondson summarizes it succinctly:

> They moved into Japanese residences, filled the most important administrative posts, replaced the Japanese as the police force, nationalized the largest industries previously owned by the Japanese, and imposed Mandarin Chinese, a foreign language to the Taiwanese, as the national dialect. Portraits of the Japanese emperor in public schools and offices were replaced by pictures of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek as the new objects of mandatory ritualized state worship, and urban spaces were reordered with place-names evoking a "motherland" that few living Taiwanese had ever seen.[46]

Taiwanese who grew up during or immediately after the transfer of power from Japan to Nationalist China observed these dynamics firsthand. For instance, Shu-Ching Cheng (賴淑卿) grew up in a paper mill company town in northeastern Taiwan in which Taiwanese workers were restricted to low-level jobs; the workers and their families lived in housing segregated first from the Japanese, and then from the Nationalists. Cheng's father, who had begun working at the mill when he was twelve, told her how the Japanese management had simply been replaced by KMT-affiliated Chinese management after the war. Although as a child she did not understand

the details, her father taught her to cultivate a critical awareness of what was happening around her, particularly when it involved the government. As she described it,

> I [didn't know about politics], but my father was very outspoken at home. It's not like other . . . parents, who don't say that. He [was] just very critical of the government. He always told me that when you read [the] newspaper, you should read it upside down. If they say white, it's black. So that's how I grew up.[47]

Taiwanese identity and consciousness were therefore deeply shaped by anticolonial and subaltern identifications. As much as it had been suppressed, this sort of consciousness was present in Taiwanese student migrants' life experiences and family histories by the time they arrived in the United States.[48] The conditions and connections they encountered and nurtured upon arrival in the United States—particularly those enabled by educationally based social networks—gave these already existing worldviews every opportunity to flourish into action.

Networks of Sociality and Concentric Circles of Politicization

Educational networks were not only the condition for their migration,[49] but also essential to Taiwanese students' ability to congregate in the United States. A substantial proportion going to the United States had been top students since elementary school, a function of an educational system that grouped students at each successive level by examination scores. The college entrance exam admitted only the highest-scoring students into the medical schools and science and engineering departments at desirable universities such as National Taiwan University and Tsinghua University. As a result, roughly the same groups of students were tracked with one another from junior high school on. Since there were few employment or postgraduate educational opportunities in Taiwan at the time, continuing onward to graduate school in the United States became so commonplace that substantial portions of whole graduating classes in, say, the physics department at National Taiwan University would find their way to the States. In fact, the educational system in Taiwan was tailored for this purpose: English was taught beginning in junior high, and students were encouraged to "specialize in skills needed in the American job market."[50]

Consequently, the United States was by far the most popular choice for study abroad during this time period, receiving 90 percent of Taiwanese student migrants between 1960 to 1979.[51] The majority of these student migrants were science- and technology-related majors.[52] Shirley L. Chang

found that from 1976 to 1981, one of every five science and technology graduates went to the United States for postgraduate study. These included graduates of the departments of mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, and chemistry. For the most prestigious universities such as National Taiwan University and Tsinghua University, this number rose to two in five—with almost 95 percent going to the United States.[53] From a Taiwanese perspective, these students—largely the top students of their generation—were widely considered to be future leaders; the popular stereotype in the United States that a science and technology orientation is correlated with an apolitical bookishness (particularly for Asian Americans) did not apply.[54] Although they might have been advised by their families to avoid politics for their own safety, culturally speaking, their particular training and skillsets were considered not antithetical but complementary to political involvement and leadership.

The first TSAs in the United States were formed by Taiwanese graduate students and faculty at midwestern universities in the early to mid-1960s. The concentration of students and flourishing of TSAs in the Midwest is striking. Although more empirical research is needed on this topic, it is evident that most Taiwanese-identified students came from working-class backgrounds and lacked social capital and financial resources. This stands in contrast with Chinese-identified students, who, while subject to many of the same structural conditions, were more likely to hail from more relatively class-privileged backgrounds with established conduits to elite universities in California and the East Coast.[55] Taiwanese-identified students therefore clustered in larger numbers in less competitive, second-tier research universities in which tuition was inexpensive and financial support—in the form of scholarships, teaching assistantships, and research assistantships—was more readily available.[56] For instance, when asked about the high concentration of Taiwanese students at Kansas State, Vivian Fu (林郁子), who enrolled there as an architectural master's student in 1969, pointed out that the university offered resident tuition for international students beginning from the first year. "My criteria was, whose tuition is the cheapest? So that's how I was in Kansas State."[57]

The history of ethnic Chinese student associations for foreign students stretches back to the early twentieth century. Of the early associations, the Chinese Students Alliance, founded in 1901 at UC Berkeley and involving two-thirds of Chinese students in the United States at its peak, seems to have operated with a similar organizational structure and long-term effects as the future TSAs; prominent Chinese intellectuals such as Hu Shi (who later became an important figure in Taiwan) were members.[58] By the 1940s and 1950s, however, the KMT was collaborating with the FBI and CIA to assert

ideological control and surveillance over diasporic Chinese organizations; by the late 1960s, the main focus of these efforts was student organizations.[59] Chinese Student Associations (CSAs) were founded ostensibly to provide a supportive social network to students from Taiwan, but also in order to monitor their activities. CSA advisors often had direct ties with the closest Republic of China consulate, and KMT agents served as liaisons for student spies. Outbound students were sometimes contacted by their university's CSA advisor prior to departure, and required to make contact after arrival.[60] Unofficial organizations were prohibited, and to name an association "Taiwanese" rather than "Chinese" was seen as proclaiming politics in opposition to the KMT.

During required government orientation sessions prior to going overseas, students outbound to the United States were explicitly warned to avoid associating with the wrong elements at campuses such as the University of Wisconsin, Madison, which, according to government officials, was "headquarters of the Communist[s] and Taiwan independence people."[61] Indeed, one of the first TSAs was established on this campus in the early 1960s. De-min Wu (吳德民), then an economics graduate student who was involved in establishing the association, recalled vociferous objections from the CSA and having to present their case to the student council before the TSA was allowed to form.[62] For Wu, who described himself as "apolitical" prior to coming to the United States, this incident made a "big impression." He felt that the CSA was "representing the thought of [the] Chinese government [referring to the KMT]. So even [if] we want [just] a small thing like a Taiwanese student organization, they won't allow us."[63] A few years later, after securing a faculty position at University of Kansas, Wu was also present for the formation of the TSA there in 1964; predictably, the regional Republic of China consulate sent a representative to dissuade the students, but they were not deterred. While serving as that TSA's first president (at the students' request), Wu openly criticized the KMT in an interview with the campus newspaper. Soon afterward, he received a letter from his father in Taiwan, communicating that his family had been visited by a government agent and told to warn Wu not to say any more. It was then that Wu fully realized the possible consequences of actions he had not conceived of as political.

In a more serious case in 1966, University of Wisconsin Ph.D. student Chii-ming Hwang was arrested after returning to Taiwan to do research for his dissertation, and sentenced to five years for sedition—ostensibly for attending a meeting of a Taiwanese independence group in Chicago and meeting an independence leader in Tokyo en route to Taiwan. Hwang's participation in student group activities in Madison seems also to have

figured into his arrest, as several months later, University of Wisconsin president Fred Harrington sent a telegram to U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk stating:

> Urgently request your intervention case Chii-ming Hwang, Republic of China graduate student at University of Wisconsin, now imprisoned by Chinese government on Taiwan. . . . Formosan Affairs Study Group was officially registered UW student group with the required faculty advisor. Such groups freely debate issues. Faculty participation in such meetings assures us no ground from charges sedition in such meetings. . . . No free university worthy of its name can tolerate this kind of political interference with legitimate research.[64]

Harrington continued, "If students from Republic of China not free to participate in discussion programs in this country, we believe will be impossible to accept further such students. Will advise other graduate schools accordingly."[65] Although the Department of State and U.S. embassy in Taipei disclaimed any responsibility for Hwang, he was ultimately retried and released for insufficient evidence in May 1967, though not permitted to leave Taiwan again.[66]

In time, most students, faculty, and administrators on U.S. campuses were well aware of the implications of starting or being involved with a TSA. At the University of Chicago in the late 1960s, John Yu (游正博) and Alice Yu (陳鈴津), a married couple who were both graduate students there, remembered that after they submitted the list of required signatures to start a TSA, the student activities advisor, a white American, tossed the list into a fireplace after approving it, knowing that having one's name on such a list could be dangerous.[67] Taiwanese students developed subtle social cues to signal if there might be a spy in their midst, and sometimes wore paper grocery bags on their heads during public events or performances in order to protect themselves from being identified.[68]

A typical arrival story once the flow of student migration was under way shows how quickly and naturally Taiwanese students became involved with TSAs. Arriving in Lafayette, Indiana, to attend Purdue University in 1969, Chris Fan (范清亮) remembered the following:

> First day I remember, when I arrive there, my classmate and her friend pick me up at airport. . . . They pick me up and I already have my dormitory reserved, check in [to] the dormitory, and they took me to the pizza place. The first time I had pizza. . . . [laughs]
>
> *Were you close friends with that classmate?*

> No, not really. Because the Taiwanese friend[s] come here, they all get together, so they have group together.

As foreign students, they were often grouped together in university housing, or found housing through already existing Taiwanese networks. For instance, Strong Chuang (莊秋雄), arriving in Manhattan, Kansas, in 1965, went to the foreign student office at Kansas State University (KSU) in search of housing, and was placed in a basement apartment to share with another Taiwanese student—an old friend from Taiwan—with a third Taiwanese student next door. Chuang quickly fell in with his roommate and neighbor's affiliations with the Formosan Club,[69] as well as their corresponding political beliefs. This marked a distinct moment in his development of Taiwanese identity. While in Taiwan, he had had "all kinds of friends who are Chinese or Taiwan origin, and they don't have any conspicuous difference"—although, he said, "inside the heart, we knew"—in the United States, "I almost immediately understand what's the difference between Taiwanese student or Chinese student from Taiwan, because it's so obvious . . . there are two groups in the campus . . . two groups of different ideology, different identity."[70]

During the 1960s, Manhattan, Kansas, became home to one of the largest Taiwanese-identified student populations, and was an epicenter for the budding Taiwan independence movement. Vivian Fu, who went to KSU several years after Chuang, described the communal caretaking Taiwanese students engaged in there:

> It's a very, very tight organization. Like, every time I need grocery . . . I call somebody and say, give me a ride. [And] early on, when I'm in the dorm . . . one day a week, there's no dinner . . . I remember never being without invitation for a dinner somewhere [on those days]. And the ones that are married . . . they are like our host family. . . . Any kind of holidays, you know, they're kind of like, "I invite these ten people. You invite [those]." They organize it like that.[71]

She felt that this closeness was a strong factor in why she developed a distinct Taiwanese identity for the first time soon after arriving in Kansas:

> I think that the environment—your being away from home—and the association there that help take care of you [were factors]. And you kind of like trust them, and then you realize that they have certain . . . points of view that later on you adopt and identify yourself with them.[72]

The social enfolded the political. At the University of Minnesota in the mid-1970s, sociology Ph.D. student Patrick Huang (黃再添) lived in a rented house near campus with six other Taiwanese students. They rotated the cooking and exercised together daily, and became a hub for the larger student community: they organized haircut days, where you could come to the house to get a cheap haircut from a friend with some scissor skills, and "learn-to-fix-your-car" days (owning a car was a new experience for most).[73] Huang's eventual induction into the WUFI came about through a friend of a friend, who loaned his car to help Huang move. That person, a Ph.D. student in physics, turned out to be the brother-in-law of the chairman of WUFI. Over lunch, they discussed Huang's organizing efforts to help needy students in Taiwan. He told Huang there was a better way to help: "you should do something about this government instead, if you are serious."[74] A few years later, Huang would move to New York to become one of WUFI's few full-time activists, and later, a key member of the Taiwan Revolutionary Party.

The structure of the social organizations enabled activists to utilize them tactically as both broad, politically actionable networks, and concentric circles of increasing politicization**.** The outermost circle was the TSAs or community-based Taiwanese associations, whose primarily social activities enabled the spreading of ideas and recruitment into the inner circles. A second, smaller circle organized the events, and discussed politics and tactics more explicitly. Finally, the third, innermost "core group"—the smallest circle—were pro-Taiwan independence activists who organized the middle group. As one member of this inner circle described it,

> This core group is really very for Taiwan independence. We say, how do we get this idea out? So we need this large crowd. . . . If you . . . say, we want Taiwan independence, a lot of people [would be] scared, they won't come . . . so we sort of have to . . . not [be] so obvious, but get as many people to come. And [if] they have big event or something, somewhere, if Taiwan have anti-human rights event happening . . . we can get a lot of people involved. But the people behind that [are] really . . . Taiwan independen[ce] activists.[75]

The regional softball tournaments popular among many Taiwanese in the United States and organized by the TSAs were one activity that served these multiple functions. Wencheng Lin (林文政), who went to Syracuse University in 1973, felt that even the choice of the sport was subtly political in nature, in that it effectively attracted Taiwanese-identified students who had been influenced by Japanese colonization prior to KMT arrival.[76]

Figure 1. Taiwanese students in Minneapolis at a "fix your own car" gathering, organized by the Taiwanese Association of Minnesota, in fall 1974. Photo courtesy of Patrick and Sharon Huang.

> I think basically, most . . . Taiwanese . . . identify [with] baseball, back in Taiwan. . . . Baseball is Japanese. It's like a Taiwanese tradition. So very subtly, when you play baseball, you identify with Taiwan. . . . And that's already there.[77]

Later, Lin recognized that the core members consciously used the regional softball tournaments to recruit and fund-raise to support political prisoners and Taiwanese independence. The annual summer tournaments linked students across the Midwest and Northeast, connecting Taiwanese from as many as ten universities across the Midwest; and between New York, Toronto, Detroit, and Washington, D.C.[78] In addition to serving clandestinely as meeting points and recruiting grounds for Taiwan independence activists of all stripes, these occasions brought together old friends and created a platform for new friendships and acquaintances that might be acted upon in the future.

The informal, flexible social structure of the softball gatherings made them, in Lin's words, "a very powerful tool." If people wanted to just play softball, eat, and enjoy the company of fellow Taiwanese, that was perfectly acceptable. Eventually, however, many repeat participants would become

key members and leaders of the TSA or *tongxianghui*. The informal social structure also enabled core members to collectively filter out fellow students who might be spies. If someone behaved suspiciously—for example, suddenly asking questions about someone's personal background—"people [would] alert each other, 'Watch out [for] this guy.' . . . 'If you are with so-and-so, don't say anything against the government.'"[79]

Other events, like an annual, regional Thanksgiving dinner in Manhattan, Kansas, served similar functions, drawing together Taiwanese students from as far away as Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Colorado. Taiwanese economics professor L. S. Fan (范良信), who was the faculty advisor for the KSU TSA and mentored many students who became independence activists, recalled donating a lot of turkey,[80] while students coordinated and participated in the cooking. Those who had experience cooking in restaurants, as many did during summers to support themselves, were especially appreciated for this event.[81] Vivian Fu, who was artistic and studying interior architecture, recalled creating elaborate place settings one year involving apples and candles for around three hundred guests.[82] Often, the key organizers were also core members of the independence groups. For example, in 1966, Strong Chuang was the lead organizer for the Thanksgiving dinner. In addition to being the KSU TSA president at the time, Chuang was a founding member of the United Formosans in America for Independence (UFAI; a precursor to WUFI) and made sure to invite its core members to the dinner, feeling obligated to "make this party very big and important" to mark the forming of UFAI earlier than same year.[83]

While largely social, these types of regular gatherings created and strengthened actionable networks for more explicitly political events or activities, such as organizing group transportation to protests and demonstrations in New York or Washington, D.C.; fund-raising for political prisoners' families; creating Taiwan independence propaganda to send to Taiwan; and—after the attempted assassination of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1970—raising bail money for would-be assassins Peter Huang and Cheng Tzu-tsai (鄭自才).[84] The local and regional social gatherings created a sense of solidarity and nurtured the development of Taiwanese identity. They also amplified affective ties and trust necessary for delicate, small-scale, and highly risky exchanges, such as the transmission of actual money to operatives in Taiwan, person-to-person communication of sensitive information, and the transmission of political writings and manifestos out of, and back into, Taiwan.[85]

Freedom of Expression and Circulation of News and Written Material

Another essential component of the development of anti-KMT Taiwanese consciousness via university-based social networks was greater access to written materials, combined with greater freedom of expression and the highly charged atmosphere of political protest in the 1960s and 1970s in the United States and globally. Sometimes, this was something student migrants had already anticipated and yearned for: to be able to read freely books that in Taiwan "you had to risk your life to read," as Lee Yuan-tse, a chemistry Ph.D. student at UC Berkeley in the 1960s, described them.[86] For example, immediately upon arriving in the United States in summer 1967, Cary Hung (洪折勝) purchased a ninety-nine-dollar "See America" bus ticket, which allowed its holder to go anywhere in the United States via Greyhound bus over a period of ninety-nine days. In addition to visiting friends, "I wanted to read books that I could not read in Taiwan." As he traveled through the United States, Hung visited as many East Asian university libraries and collections as he could before the fall semester began at Colorado State University, where he would enter a Ph.D. program in hydraulic engineering. Before the summer was over, he realized that he had become convinced of the need for Taiwanese independence.[87] This conviction would shape the rest of his life: Hung would later become one of the WUFI's few full-time activists, giving up a stable engineering career to do so, and then, in the 1980s, a leader of the Taiwan Revolutionary Party, which split from the mainstream Taiwanese independence activists to advocate a left-leaning path for Taiwan's future.

In addition to what they could read from libraries, students advocating a broad spectrum of political positions made, self-published, and circulated magazines and journals via the TSAs' contact lists. Some even went door to door to disseminate them.[88] Recipients might use chopsticks to turn the pages or to throw the material away, for fear of leaving fingerprints on the subversive material. Copies of Kerr's *Formosa Betrayed* were checked out from the university libraries and passed around. Former classmates dispersed to campuses throughout the United States devised ingenious ways to keep in touch and share with one another their experiences and impressions of U.S. society, such as "circular letters," in which the recipient would write their latest news in a booklet with multiple sequential entries, before mailing it to the next person in line; multiple booklets circulating simultaneously meant that news could be shared among a group with greater efficiency and frequency.[89]

In the late 1970s, Morgan Fu-hsiung Chang (張富雄) and his wife, Eileen "Yi-Yi" Chang (楊宜宜), members of the Taiwanese Association of

America – New York, started a telephone line, "Voice of Taiwan" (known to every person I have interviewed so far), which eventually spawned forty-one local affiliates, and could be called from anywhere to access recorded messages describing the latest political developments concerning Taiwan.[90] According to Morgan Chang, "I had gotten this idea from the fact that, back then, in the United States, we could call a phone number at any time to get the day's weather. I used this service every morning and thought it was very convenient."[91] Voice of Taiwan became one of the most important and widespread means of communication among Taiwanese both in Taiwan and in the diaspora during the late 1970s and early 1980s, sometimes serving as the sole or most timely carrier of news regarding urgent political events both into and out of Taiwan.[92]

Raymond Lee (李瑞木), who arrived in the United States a KMT party member and was on a KMT government scholarship, recalled receiving a pamphlet advocating Taiwanese independence soon after arriving at the University of Minnesota in 1968. When he read it, it "[i]mmediately hit my heart. . . . I'm still a [KMT] party member [at the time]. . . . But when I receive that propaganda, Taiwan independence magazine, now I understand everything. So I change my whole . . . mindset." Lee, like many of my interviewees, also mentioned reading *Formosa Betrayed* as extremely influential. When I asked him how he felt when he read it, even more than four decades later, his eyes filled with tears and he responded, simply, "I cried." Within two years of his arrival in the United States, Lee had joined WUFI and was deeply engaged in developing and promoting guerrilla tactics to secure Taiwanese independence.

In Chicago in 1969, John and Alice Yu marveled at the student sit-ins, strikes, and protests against the Vietnam War, a stark contrast after coming "from a country that had been ruled by the martial law for that many years." The trial of the Chicago Eight (later known as the Chicago Seven) that year made a deep impression on them, particularly Black Panther Bobby Seale's refusal to be silenced by the judge in the case; eventually Seale was bound and gagged in the courtroom, and sentenced to four years in prison for contempt of court. "[T]hat was [a] really eye-opening experience for us to see how you fight against racial discrimination. It's civil disobedience, basically." The willingness of protestors, including some of the "most outstanding student[s]," to speak up publicly against the government was "eye-opening."[93]

Taiwanese students quickly gained the courage to participate in this vastly more open public sphere, not only creating and circulating their own publications within Taiwanese circles (as already mentioned), but also entering mainstream spaces of dialogue. In the realm of written material,

they submitted op-eds to campus and local newspapers. In an early incident at KSU in January 1966, Taiwanese and Chinese-identified students sparred almost daily for weeks in the "Campus Comment" section of the *Kansas State Collegian*, the university's student newspaper, after the campus visit of Margaret Baker, an American "authority on the Orient" who praised the achievements of the KMT in "Free China." After attending the event, wrote one Taiwanese letter writer, "The memory of so many hungry, suffering people back home made me unable to sleep. . . . I feel that I must tell the story of the suffering people whose blood is being sucked to feed the vain glory of a dictator." The author called upon Americans to "open your eyes": "Most Americans staunchly believe that the United States is fighting everywhere for democracy and freedom. Maybe you are right. But, there is one exception—Formosa. . . . It's time for the United States to review its relationship to this 'staunch ally.'"[94]

A *Collegian* reporter noted that this event "caused more public reaction and comment than perhaps any speaker this year."[95] Eventually, with no resolution in sight, the newspaper editors called for an end to the back-and-forth in the letters section. Undeterred, the following month, "a group of Formosans at KSU" took advantage of the *Collegian's* paid advertisement space to place an ad memorializing the victims of 1947's 228 Incident, which their Chinese-identified adversaries in the Campus Comment section had denied ever happened. Since the 228 Incident was a highly symbolic, watershed event in Taiwanese history and identity formation, the ad served as a defiant assertion of autonomy, and was almost certainly understood by Chinese-identified students as such.[96]

These types of early scuffles, albeit relatively minor in themselves, developed Taiwanese student activists' capacity and experience at the local level and prepared them for larger-scale struggles in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when a number of significant events rocked Taiwan and its diaspora, including the Presbyterian Church's Human Rights Declaration advocating Taiwanese independence (1977), the United States' severing of diplomatic ties with Taiwan and establishment of relations with the People's Republic of China (1979), the Kaohsiung Incident (1979), the Lin family murders (1980), and the death of Carnegie Mellon professor Chen Wen-cheng (陳文成) under suspicious circumstances on a return visit to Taiwan (1981).

In response to these events, diasporic supporters used many of the same methods developed in the earlier campus and local venues, but at a larger scale. For example, after the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan published the Human Rights Declaration, which was immediately banned by the KMT, Morgan Chang had his sister smuggle the document out of Taiwan

(unbeknownst to her at the time). In addition to continuously broadcasting its contents on Voice of Taiwan, Chang organized 68 members of Taiwanese associations and Taiwanese churches throughout the United States, as well as other "church friends," to purchase a large ad in the *New York Times* publicizing the document and calling for Taiwanese independence.[97]

In the wake of the Kaohsiung Incident, a mass demonstration for democracy in December 1979 that instigated a violent police crackdown, eight opposition leaders known as the Kaohsiung Eight (among dozens arrested and put on trial) risked death sentences. Diasporic networks rooted in or supported by TSA and Taiwanese association connections used many of the methods and networks they had already developed by this time to direct international attention to the trials. They wrote op-ed letters to publications such as the *New York Times* and the *Boston Globe*, and funneled money covertly to prisoners' families in Taiwan. They set up tables on campuses and at shopping malls to petition U.S. congressmen for support. The Formosan Association of Human Rights (FAHR), an organization of diasporic Taiwanese then headquartered in San Diego, organized a national speaking tour for Linda Gail Arrigo (艾琳達), the American wife of Taiwanese dissident Shih Ming-teh (施明德). Arrigo had just been deported from Taiwan for her own involvement in the Kaohsiung Incident. At each of Arrigo's stops, FAHR notified the news media and marshaled their TSA and Taiwanese Association contacts across the country to turn up large crowds carrying signs advocating human rights and freedom in Taiwan.[98] The publicity and advocacy contributed to international pressure for an open trial for the dissidents, which, counter to the KMT's usual practices, did take place. FAHR activists from that time believe today that the attention and response these actions triggered played a key role in saving the dissidents from being executed and exposing the authoritarian practices and human rights violations of the KMT to the world.[99]

These selected incidents show that by the late 1970s, the local, regional, and national infrastructures of TSAs and Taiwanese associations already existed and were well-developed for the purposes of diasporic political activism; core members had extensive experience working and acting together by then. They might move from region to region due to educational and employment opportunities, but because of the similarities in their backgrounds and areas of expertise, they tended to cluster in similar places and found themselves reunited in one region or another. In this sense, the structural forces of selective migration and developing Cold War geopolitical advantage worked inadvertently to nurture the social conditions for collective activism.

Conclusion: "Accidental Activists"

From the experiences and perspectives of student migrants, it becomes clear that through practices of intimidation and threat, the KMT inadvertently built the infrastructure for their own opposition, encouraging "native" Taiwanese to separate themselves from their Chinese-identified counterparts and awakening a Taiwanese consciousness in many who had never previously felt strongly about such things. Diasporic Taiwanese in the United States were propelled by geopolitical forces and conditions beyond their control, excluded from most historical accounts, and marginalized in scholarly discourse. In spite of, or perhaps because of, these facts, they built resilient social networks and organizations that affirmed their own existence, and yielded political networks that asserted their right to choose their own identities and futures.

Many of the student migrants I interviewed believed that they would not have become politically active in the same way if they had not come to the United States. For example, Vivian Fu called herself an "accidental activist."[100] The key difference, for Fu and others as well, was that circumstances in the United States allowed her "opportunities [to] actually identify myself as Taiwanese," which she felt she may not have had in Taiwan.[101] The repressive actions of the KMT toward diasporic Taiwanese also placed migrants who found themselves blacklisted on something of a one-way road. For instance, Edward Cheng, although earlier hesitant to join an oppositional organization, became willing to take a leadership position in FAHR "because I was already on the blacklist," and had no hope of returning to Taiwan while the current regime continued.[102]

However, while the United States served as an incubator for the development of diasporic political activism with regard to Taiwan, collectively, most Taiwanese student migrants never developed a sustained critique of the United States itself—in particular, of its central role in supporting the KMT and sustaining the authoritarian regime. In part, this was due to their relative isolation and insularity within U.S. society. As class-privileged migrants who were racialized as model minorities, they benefited to some degree from the status quo and consequently did not have any radical cache among other marginalized groups; and as first-generation immigrants with limited English abilities, they found it difficult to develop relationships and solidarity with non-Taiwanese. In addition to having opportunities to profit careerwise from Cold War geopolitics because of their specific conditions of migration, they had also been educated in Taiwan with pro-U.S. ideologies, and Taiwan remained reliant on the promise of U.S. military protection. Perhaps most importantly, a sense of relief from

escaping an authoritarian society and being able to live and think more freely predisposed many to feel gratefulness and sentimental attachment to the United States. Cumulatively, these factors provided an emotional and experiential basis for belief in American exceptionalism and the model minority myth, which, as Victor Bascara has pointed out, work together powerfully to erase any consideration of U.S. imperialism.[103] Because of these factors, eventually mainstream Taiwanese/American political activism focused rather single-mindedly on opposing the KMT through civic appeals to the U.S. state,[104] and never developed a wide-reaching politics in a truly internationalist or anticolonial sense.

How, then, should we understand Taiwanese migrant student activism in the larger context of Asian American studies and history? It is clear that student migrants were highly successful in seeking out and building connections with each other, efforts that would bear significant social and political fruits with regard to Taiwan. Their experiences are instructive in considering the importance of social organizations and networks to the formation of political consciousness and activism for diasporic and other marginalized communities. They show the critical subjectivity of first-generation immigrants and class-privileged migrants, and how the contradictory nature of the U.S. relationship to Taiwan during the Cold War era provided both opportunities and constraints. As Chih-ming Wang points out, "it is . . . important to consider the political activities of foreign students because studying abroad is not just a personal pursuit for a better education and life, but also a national project historically articulated within nationalism and against Western colonialism in Asia."[105] In other words, Taiwanese/American subjectivities and experiences must be understood through the simultaneous consideration of multiple narratives and scales. Seen in this way, they are part of a recasting of Asian/American history as not linear or unified but troubled, ambiguous, shifting, and contradictory—a characterization that more fully reflects the United States' dynamic and power-laden relationship with Asia, as well as the people who were transported and their lives forever altered by those relationships.

Notes

1. Chinese names of Taiwanese immigrants are rendered in English with Romanized Chinese or English given name first, followed by surname. The names of well-known figures in Taiwan who never habitually used an English name follow common usage (usually surname first). Chinese names are included with the first mention of the person's name with surname first. Women's surnames in Chinese are their maiden names.
2. Interview with Edward Cheng (March 13, 2013), Rancho Santa Fe, Calif.

3. Linda Gail Arrigo, "Patterns of Personal and Political Life among Taiwanese-Americans," *Taiwan Inquiry,* no. 1 (2006). These numbers cover 1965–89 and are calculated from numbers compiled by the Taiwan Ministry of Education. Arrigo notes that there are numerous inconsistencies in the original tables. Peter Kwong presents the number as closer to 150,000 (Kwong, *The New Chinatown* [New York: Hill & Wang, 1996], 60). However, Shirley L. Chang presents numbers for 1960–85 comparable to those of Arrigo ("Causes of Brain Drain and Solutions: The Taiwan Experience," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 27, no. 1 [1992]: 27–43).
4. One of the members of the Union of Vietnamese recalls speaking at the University of Wisconsin during this time period (email, May Fu, January 17, 2016); see May Fu, "Beyond Vietnam: Vietnamese Antiwar Organizing and Solidarity in the US" (paper, American Studies Association conference, Toronto, October 8–11, 2015).
5. Fu, "Beyond Vietnam." Also see Tram Quang Nguyen, "Caring for the Soul of Our Community: Vietnamese Youth Activism in the 1960s and Today," in *Asian Americans: The Movement and the Moment*, ed. Steve Louie and Glenn Omatsu (Los Angeles: UCLA Asian American Studies Center Press, 2014), 284–304.
6. Fu, "Beyond Vietnam," 2.
7. Chih-ming Wang, *Transpacific Articulations: Student Migration and the Remaking of Asian America* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2013), 4. Instead, Wang argues, we should consider student migrants as active participants in Asian/American intellectual and political history.
8. This insight builds upon the arguments of C. Wang, *Transpacific Articulations*, and Jodi Kim, *Ends of Empire: Asian American Critique and the Cold War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010).
9. For instance, in two of the most informative studies of ethnic Chinese migration to the United States, Madeline Hsu (*The Good Immigrants: How the Yellow Peril Became the Model Minority* [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2015]) and Kwong (*New Chinatown*) both discuss in depth the political nuances affecting immigration from Taiwan to the United States, but neither treats Taiwanese-identified migrants as distinct from Chinese-identified migrants.
10. Hsu (*Good Immigrants*) covers in detail Chinese-identified students from Taiwan. For the purposes of this article, the terms "Taiwanese" and "Taiwanese-identified" refer to ethnic Chinese (mostly Hoklo and Hakka) whose families settled in Taiwan from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. The terminology does not include Chinese who came to Taiwan with the Kuomintang after 1949, since during the 1960s and 1970s, they would have been unlikely to identify, or be seen, as Taiwanese (this has changed among subsequent generations). It also does not refer to the indigenous, Austronesian peoples of Taiwan, who constitute a small but significant fraction of Taiwan's population. What it means to be Taiwan-

ese—who can claim it, who is claimed by it, and what it would mean to reckon fully with the settler colonial history of Taiwan—is a complex and ongoing issue that deserves serious consideration, but is beyond the scope of this article. For an indigenous-centered, introductory overview of the issues at hand, see Scott Simon, "Writing Indigeneity in Taiwan," in *Re-writing Culture in Taiwan*, ed. Fang-Long Shih, Stuart Thompson, and Paul-François Tremlett (New York: Routledge, 2008), 50–68. On the politics of indigeneity vis-à-vis the history and identity of Taiwan, see Michael Stainton, "The Politics of Taiwan Aboriginal Origins," in *Taiwan: A New History*, ed. Murray A. Rubinstein (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2007).

11. Douglas Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). Mendel conducted over six hundred interviews with "students, teachers, and businessmen." The categorization "politically active" indicated that they participated in "a range of activities from open protests to participation in discussion and study groups categorized as illegal by the Nationalist government."
12. Cited in Robert Edmondson, "The February 28 Incident and National Identity," in *Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*, ed. Stephane Corcuff (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2009), 34.
13. Arrigo, "Patterns of Personal and Political Life"; H. Mark Lai, *Chinese American Transnational Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2010), 39–41.
14. Interview with Alice Yu (April 4, 2014), Rancho Santa Fe, Calif.
15. Avery Gordon, *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 4–5.
16. See Christian Collet and Pei-te Lien, *The Transnational Politics of Asian Americans* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2009); Lai, *Chinese American Transnational Politics*.
17. In most accounts of the Asian American Movement as well as collections concerning Asian American political activism more generally, Taiwanese are not mentioned at all. For a recent example, see Louie and Omatsu, *Asian Americans*.
18. Hsu, *Good Immigrants*, 2.
19. Arrigo, "Patterns of Personal and Political Life"; Paul A. Kramer, "Is the World Our Campus? International Students and U.S. Global Power in the Long Twentieth Century," *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 5 (2009): 775–806; N. V. Varghese, "Globalization of Higher Education and Cross-Border Student Mobility" (UNESCO, IIEP Research Paper, 2008), http://www.unesco.org/iiep/PDF/pubs/2008/Globalization_HE.pdf (accessed June 9, 2015); Hsu, *Good Immigrants*.
20. Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho, eds., *Militarized Currents: Toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010).
21. Kim, *Ends of Empire*.

22. Kuan-Hsing Chen, *Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2010). Chen's arguments, as discussed in *Asia as Method*, build upon the work of Asian scholars involved with the journal *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*.
23. Shu-mei Shih, "Globalisation and the (In)significance of Taiwan," *Postcolonial Studies* 6, no. 2 (2003): 143–53.
24. In contrast, the field of Taiwan studies offers rich and nuanced perspectives on social, political, and cultural issues related to Taiwan; however, there is still relatively little work even in this field focusing on Taiwanese Americans. For an overview of the current state of the field of Taiwan studies, see, for example, the Second World Congress of Taiwan Studies detailed conference program (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, June 18–20, 2015), http://wcts.sinica.edu.tw/05_03_en.php.
25. Franklin Ng, in *The Taiwanese Americans* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1998), provides an introductory overview of Taiwanese American history, culture, and communities. Others focus on the role of religion among Taiwanese Americans (Carolyn Chen, *Getting Saved in America: Taiwanese Immigration and Religious Experience* [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008]); transpacific enclave formation (Hsiang-shui Chen, *Chinatown No More: Taiwan Immigrants in Contemporary New York* [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992]); and transnational home, family, and place making (Shenglin Chang, *The Global Silicon Valley Home: Lives and Landscapes within Taiwanese American Trans-Pacific Culture* [Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006]; Maria W. L. Chee, *Taiwanese American Transnational Families: Women and Kin Work* [New York: Routledge, 2005]).
26. S. Chang, *Global Silicon Valley Home*.
27. For a sampling of this literature, see Timothy Fong, *The First Suburban Chinatown: The Remaking of Monterey Park, California* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994); Aihwa Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999); S. Chang, *Global Silicon Valley Home*; Wei Li, "Building Ethnoburbia: The Emergence and Manifestation of the Chinese Ethnoburb in Los Angeles' San Gabriel Valley," *Journal of Asian American Studies* 2, no. 1 (1999): 1–28; Yen-Fen Tseng, "Chinese Ethnic Economy: San Gabriel Valley, Los Angeles County," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 16, no. 2 (1994): 169–89; Min Zhou, Yen-Fen Tseng, and Rebecca Kim, "Rethinking Residential Assimilation: The Case of a Chinese Ethnoburb in the San Gabriel Valley, California," *Amerasia Journal* 34, no. 3 (2008): 53–83; and AnnaLee Saxenian, *Local and Global Networks of Immigrant Professionals in Silicon Valley* (San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California, 2002).
28. E.g., Ong, *Flexible Citizenship*; S. Chang, *Global Silicon Valley Home*; and Saxenian, *Local and Global Networks*.
29. Of these, C. Wang's (*Transpacific Articulations*) research and analysis on the politicization of Taiwanese students involved in the Baodiao and Taidu (Taiwan Independence) movements are the most thorough. For a

sampling of other literature that addresses this topic, see Ng, *Taiwanese Americans*; Weider Shu, "Who Joined the Clandestine Political Organization? Some Preliminary Evidence from the Overseas Taiwan Independence Movement," in Corcuff, *Memories of the Future*, 47–69; Meiling T. Wang, *The Dust That Never Settles: The Taiwan Independence Campaign and U.S.-China Relations* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1999), 187–98; and Edmondson, "February 28 Incident." Looking at the transnational political activities of Taiwanese Americans, Pei-te Lien includes Taiwanese under the umbrella of "Chinese Americans" and "overseas Chinese" (Lien, "Ethnic Homeland and Chinese Americans: Conceiving a Transnational Political Network," in *Chinese Transnational Networks*, ed. Chee Beng Tan [London: Routledge, 2007], 107–21).

30. Abdelmalek Sayad, *The Suffering of the Immigrant* (Malden, Mass.: Polity, 2004), 1.
31. Taiwan Foundation for Democracy and Pi-chuan Yang, *The Road to Freedom* (Taipei: Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, 2000); M. T. Wang, *Dust That Never Settles*, 102–26; Michael Forsythe, "Taiwan Turns Light on 1947 Slaughter by Chiang Kai-shek's Troops," *New York Times*, July 14, 2015, http://nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/asia/taiwan-turns-light-on-1947-slaughter-by-chiang-kai-sheks-troops.html.
32. Taiwan Foundation for Democracy and Yang, *Road to Freedom*.
33. C. Wang, *Transpacific Articulations*, 94.
34. Su Bing, *Taiwan's 400 Year History: The Origins and Continuing Development of the Taiwanese Society and People* (Washington, D.C.: Taiwanese Cultural Grass Roots Association, 1986), 101.
35. George Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 4.
36. Su, *Taiwan's 400 Year History*, 157. This sentiment remains strong in Taiwan: in January 2016, just after being elected, President Tsai Ing-wen stated that the desire for freedom is a core Taiwanese value. Su Bing was an outspoken supporter of Tsai's.
37. Interview with Chiu-shan Chen (July 18, 2013), San Diego, Calif.
38. K. Chen, *Asia as Method*.
39. Ibid. Chen argues that in the past two decades, the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan has done so.
40. Su, *Taiwan's 400 Year History*, 5, emphasis added.
41. Ibid., 5.
42. In a notable recent development, however, in 2016, Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen apologized to the indigenous people of Taiwan on behalf of the government for the first time, for "centuries of injustice." Austin Ramzy, "Taiwan's President Apologizes to Aborigines for Centuries of Injustice," *New York Times*, August 1, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/02/world/asia/taiwan-aborigines-tsai-apology.html.
43. At the time of our interview (January 2011), Lee Yuan-tse, a Nobel Prize–winning chemist, had just been elected the president of the International Council for Science.

44. Interview with Lee Yuan-tse (January 4, 2011), Taipei, Taiwan.
45. Interviews with Lin Shiaw-Shin (January 4, 2011), Taipei, Taiwan; Shu-Ching Cheng (March 13, 2013), Rancho Santa Fe, Calif; and Cary Hung (November 7, 2015), Ridgewood, Queens, N.Y. Also see C. Wang, *Transpacific Articulations*, 66–89.
46. Edmondson, "Negotiations of Taiwan's Identity among Generations of Liuxuesheng" (overseas Students) and Taiwanese Americans" (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 2002), 27.
47. Interview with Shu-Ching Cheng (March 13, 2013), Rancho Santa Fe, Calif.
48. While an extended discussion of these experiences and histories and their repercussions is beyond the scope of this article, my interviewees related numerous examples of direct encounters with state violence and colonial social hierarchies while growing up.
49. See Hsu, *Good Immigrants*.
50. Kwong, *New Chinatown*, 61.
51. S. L. Chang, "Causes of Brain Drain." See also Varghese, "Globalization of Higher Education."
52. S. L. Chang, "Causes of Brain Drain"; S. Chang, *Global Silicon Valley Home*, 41.
53. S. L. Chang, "Causes of Brain Drain." Kwong (*New Chinatown*) states that the percentage of science graduates from National Taiwan University who went to the United States during this time period is 70–80 percent; however, no source is cited for this figure (61). Similar firsthand observations were mentioned in numerous interviews.
54. As it turns out, this view was not consistently held by the U.S. government and mainstream population either, as the 1990s case of Taiwan-born Los Alamos scientist Wen-Ho Lee illustrates. Lee was detained in solitary confinement for months on suspicion of espionage (all espionage charges were later dropped and a federal judge apologized to Lee for the government's mishandling of his case). See Wen-Ho Lee, *My Country versus Me: The First-Hand Account by the Los Alamos Scientist Who Was Falsely Accused of Being a Spy* (New York: Hyperion, 2001); and Crystal Parikh, *An Ethics of Betrayal: The Politics of Otherness in Emergent US Literatures and Culture* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009), 129–59.
55. See Hsu, *Good Immigrants*.
56. S. L. Chang, "Causes of Brain Drain."
57. Interview with Vivian Fu (July 16, 2013), Carlsbad, Calif.
58. Hsu, *Good Immigrants*, 59.
59. Edmondson, "February 28 Incident."
60. Ibid., 79.
61. Interview with Edward Cheng (March 13, 2013), Rancho Santa Fe, Calif. This practice is also mentioned in Peng Mingmin, *A Taste of Freedom: Memoirs of a Formosan Independence Leader* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), 254; and Edmondson, "February 28 Incident," 75–76.

62. Interview with De-min Wu (August 18, 2015), San Diego, Calif.
63. Ibid.
64. Mendel, *Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, 166.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., 167.
67. Interview with John and Alice Yu (April 14, 2014), Rancho Santa Fe, Calif.
68. Interviews with Lin Wencheng (July 30, 2014), Rosemead, Calif; Chris Fan (July 24, 2013), Rancho Santa Fe, Calif.; and Vivian Fu (July 16, 2013), Carlsbad, Calif.
69. "Formosan Club" is another common English translation of *tongxianghui*, or Taiwanese association, from this time period.
70. Interview with Strong Chuang (June 12, 2014), via Skype.
71. Interview with Vivian Fu (July 16, 2013), Carlsbad, Calif.
72. Ibid.
73. Interview with Patrick Huang (November 10, 2015), Brooklyn, N.Y.
74. Ibid.
75. Interviewee's name withheld upon request. This basic structure was described in two other interviews as well, with longtime WUFI members Raymond Lee (August 20, 2013, San Diego, Calif.) and Strong Chuang (June 12, 2014, via Skype).
76. On the history of the Japanese introduction of baseball to Taiwan and the later use of baseball in constructing a distinct Taiwanese national identity, see Junwei Yu, *Playing in Isolation: A History of Baseball in Taiwan* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007). Also see Peng Mingmin's autobiography, *Taste of Freedom*, in which he describes his love of baseball and the seriousness with which his Japanese school masters taught the sport in the colonial era (16–17).
77. Interview with Lin Wencheng (July 30, 2014), Rosemead, Calif.
78. Interviews with Chris Fan (July 24, 2013), Rancho Santa Fe, Calif., and Lin Wencheng (July 30, 2014), Rosemead, Calif. In 1975, the year Edward Cheng participated in organizing the midwestern regional tournament at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, he recalls that five or six teams came from out of state, "as far away as from Missouri" (interview with Edward Cheng, March 13, 2013, Rancho Santa Fe, Calif.).
79. Interview with Lin Wencheng (July 30, 2014), Rosemead, Calif.
80. Interviews with L. S. Fan (August 6, 2014), via telephone.
81. Interviews with Strong Chuang and Chien-mei Chuang (June 12, 2014), via Skype; and L. S. Fan (August 6, 2014), via telephone.
82. Interview with Vivian Fu (July 16, 2013), Carlsbad, Calif.
83. Interviews with Strong Chuang and Chien-mei Chuang (June 12, 2014), via Skype.
84. Interviews with L. S. Fan (August 6, 2014), via telephone; Strong Chuang and Chien-mei Chuang (June 12, 2014), via Skype; Chris Fan (July 24, 2013), Rancho Santa Fe, Calif.; Edward Cheng (March 13, 2013), Rancho Santa

Fe, Calif.; Raymond Lee (August 20, 2013), San Diego, Calif.; and Alice and John Yu (April 14, 2014), Rancho Santa Fe, Calif.

85. Numerous firsthand instances of these types of exchanges were mentioned in my interviews.
86. Interview with Lee Yuan-tse (January 4, 2011), Taipei, Taiwan.
87. Interview with Cary Hung (November 7, 2015), Ridgewood, Queens, N.Y.
88. Strong Chuang recalled going door to door to distribute copies of *Formosa Gram*, WUFI's publication, when he arrived at Purdue University after leaving KSU in 1967, and encountering a lot of hostility. Chuang took on great personal risk to do this, essentially openly identifying himself to strangers as pro-Taiwan independence. Interviews with Strong Chuang and Chien-mei Chuang (June 12, 2014), via Skype.
89. Interview with Lin Shiaw Shin (January 4, 2011), Taipei. Lin estimated that sixty to seventy people participated in this correspondence group, with six booklets in circulation at once.
90. Morgan Chang, "Witnessing the Kaohsiung Incident—Selected Tape Recordings of Voice of Taiwan," in *A Borrowed Voice: Taiwan Human Rights through International Networks, 1960–1980*, ed. Linda Gail Arrigo and Lynn Miles [Wo de Sheng Yin Jie Gei Ni: Taiwan Ren Quan Su Qiu Yu Guo Ji Lian Luo Wang 1960–1980] (Taipei: Social Empowerment Alliance, 2008), 337–45. The Changs started Voice of Taiwan in 1977 from their apartment in Woodside, Queens, with the initial assistance of the Taiwanese Association of America – New York. Voice of Taiwan was in operation until 1982 and covered many pivotal moments in the struggle for democracy and human rights in Taiwan.
91. Ibid., 337.
92. Ibid. Also see Linda Gail Arrigo, "Three Years and a Lifetime Swept Up in Taiwan's Democratic Movement, 1977–1979," in Arrigo and Miles, *Borrowed Voice*, 274–374, 322.
93. Interview with John and Alice Yu (April 14, 2014), Rancho Santa Fe, Calif.
94. The author requested anonymity for security reasons. "Campus Comment," *Kansas State Collegian*, January 17, 1966, 2, http://archive.org/details/KSULKSColl196566V72N6677 (accessed May 21, 2015). This incident was also discussed in my interviews with L. S. Fan, and Strong and Chien-Mei Chuang.
95. Susie Miller, "Debates Develop in Strange Ways" (Editorial), *Kansas State Collegian*, January 17, 1966, 2, http://archive.org/details/KSULKSColl-196566V72N6677 (accessed May 21, 2015).
96. See Edmondson, "Negotiations of Taiwan's Identity."
97. M. Chang, "Witnessing the Kaohsiung Incident."
98. Interview with Chris Fan (July 24, 2013), Rancho Santa Fe, Calif.; also see Linda Gail Arrigo, "In Mortal Combat with the Government Information Office: 'Is Linda the Liar, or James Soong?,'" in Arrigo and Miles, *Borrowed Voice*, 376–448, 380.

99. Interviews with Chris Fan (July 24, 2013), Rancho Santa Fe, Calif.; Edward Cheng (March 13, 2013), Rancho Santa Fe, Calif.; and Alice and John Yu (April 4, 2014), Rancho Santa Fe, Calif. Fan was the president and Cheng the secretary of FAHR from 1979 to 1980.
100. Interview with Vivian Fu (July 16, 2013), Carlsbad, Calif.
101. Ibid.
102. Interview with Edward Cheng (March 13, 2013), Rancho Santa Fe, Calif.
103. Victor Bascara, *Model-Minority Imperialism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006).
104. C. Wang, *Transpacific Articulations*, describes this form of politics as "civic transnationalism."
105. C. Wang, *Transpacific Articulations*, 6–7.